Part-1
What went wrong with Omar’s Kashmir?

Contrary to Sheikh’s egoism and Farooq’s jingoism, the ‘youngest CM’ lived under inferiority complex

Ahmed Ali Fayyaz

SRINAGAR, Aug 12: Phenomenal success of the Assembly elections of 2008 set in a wave of jubilation and euphoria in the mainstream political circles and establishment from Srinagar to New Delhi. A little over 61% of the electorate had exercised their franchise---over 1700,000 of them in Kashmir valley alone---without any sort of coercion, fist time since 1987. Few among the political analysts and very senior politicians had expected this historic turnout in an Indian democratic exercise held in weeks of a mass street agitation in the Valley.

Most of the people, who participated in the election, as well as many of those who did not, for varied reasons, seemed to have reasons behind their relief. The elections reversed the situation of an unprecedented regional and communal divide witnessed in the middle of 2008. There was a lot of jubilation over Omar Abdullah becoming the country's youngest Chief Minister. They thought the young Chief Minister understood the importance of blending employment opportunities, development and political resolution of the Kashmir issue by strengthening dialogue between India and Pakistan.

In most of his statements during the election campaign, Omar had underscored the need of responsive governance and specified “better roads, power supplies, drinking water, healthcare and qualitative education” as the major indicators of the government's performance.

Suffering from the disadvantage of being a non-resident politician, whose importance stemmed from his dynastic background, Omar demonstrated his lack of political understanding and administrative acumen from his day one in office. While bargaining partnership with Congress and later making two selections of his Council of Ministers, he made blatant mistakes.

Obviously, in lieu of his full six-year term as Chief Minister, he handed almost all of his flagship portfolios---roads, water, health, education---to the coalition partner, Congress. He lacked numerical strength to form the government of his own but still had nearly double the seats Mufti Mohammad Sayeed possessed in November 2002. Shepherd of the thin herd of 16 in a House of 87, Mufti did not budge an inch from his cardinal demand of holding the first half of his coalition government’s term. He made Congress bow with his obduracy for a full month after declaration of the results.

Omar also humiliated the most influential of his party colleagues, including the one who had secured highest number of votes among more than 2,000 contestants in Kashmir, by keeping them out of his Cabinet. Those inducted were no less disappointed over their 'insignificant' portfolios. Bureaucrats and officials, known for their rank opportunism, political loyalty and proximity to the Opposition, managed to retain key positions in Omar-led coalition government.

Omar’s father, Dr Farooq Abdullah, who shifted to the national platform, was also appointed NC's President. Party’s organizational structure passed through a fresh membership drive but the key office bearers were never appointed. Omar’s predicament became public last month when, during the course of a television interview, he said that he had more time than his father to operate as the NC’s President.

Consequently, an effective delivery system, consistent with NC's election manifesto, vision document and political ideology, failed to be in place. CM never seemed to be having liaison with his party rank and file, including the seniormost legislators and Ministers of his government. Like total inertia during the days of pandemonium over Shopian in 2008, NC’s leaders, legislators and Ministers seldom held a deliberation over the current spate of street turmoil until it blew into a catastrophe two months ago.

Within weeks of his taking over in January 2009, complacency and nonchalance was abundantly in evidence. Chief Minister attended little business in the maiden session of the legislature. He enjoyed alpine skiing over Afarwat on the day of his first reply on the Governor’s address. His notes had been saved meticulously by his officials and aides and the speech was pretty emphatic but his absence from the House was marked with disdain by the Opposition and with concern by the Treasury Benches.

Over the months, Omar seemed to believe that connections with New Delhi were more important than the liaison with his electors in the state. This led almost to a political vacuum and system failure in governance. Ignominiously marginalized by the elections, Valley’s separatist leadership found it easier to stage a comeback. Growing disillusionment among the masses came handy to hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani who literally wept over the Kashmiris’ infidelity of participating in the 2008 elections at a news conference after his release from jail and seemed to be desperately looking for issues until as recently as in May 2010.

Geelani, who was seen using his elbow to grab a bit of the political space with the vegetarian issue of restricting Amarnath pilgrimage to 15 days, with the real concern on ecology, has filled up the vacuum with aplomb and grown as an undisputed king of Kashmir’s secessionist politics in the last two months. He is now deciding on what days Omar and his Cabinet Ministers can move on the roads in Kashmir and when the government’s offices should open and close.



(To be continued....)